We study the interplay between taxation, bubble formation and economic growth. A rational bubble may be beneficial when growth is fuelled by public investment (or R&D externalities) and the government levies taxes on bubble returns to finance this investment. Our main result challenges the conventional view about the negative effect of bubbles in endogenous growth (Grossman and Yanagawa, 1993) .
Introduction
A pure bubble arises when the equilibrium price of an asset bringing no dividends is strictly positive.
1 In the mid of Eighties, Tirole (1985) found out that a pure bubble may emerge in OLG economies under capital overaccumulation. Proposition 2 of his influential paper pointed out that the asymptotically bubbly equilibrium is efficient while any asymptotically bubbleless equilibrium is not.
Our paper reconsiders these results in an OLG model with fiscal policy. We study the impact of taxes on bubble dynamics and endogenous growth. Differently from Grossman and Yanagawa (1993) , the growth fuel is the government spending in R&D (in the spirit of Barro (1990) ). R&D investments are financed through the taxes not only on labor and capital income but also on returns on the bubble asset. The novelty of our paper rests on this additional fiscal instrument and its consequences. A comparison between these different taxes is also of interest.
First, we find that there is room for bubbles if and only if the aftertax interest rate in the bubbleless equilibrium is lower than the population growth rate. Therefore, bubbles appear if the tax rate on capital income is sufficiently high while they are ruled out if the tax rates on labor income or on the bubble return are sufficiently large. Moreover, with some specifications, we provide a full characterization of equilibrium dynamics, that is a global analysis of capital and bubble dynamics. The size of the bubble is explicitly computed.
Second, we figure out the cases where bubbles may harm or promote economic growth. If bubbles do not exist and, de facto, the government is prevented from using bubble taxes, while it is allowed to play only with low tax rates on capital and labor income, R&D activities turn out to be underfunded with detrimental effects on economic growth. Conversely, positive bubbles may ensure additional fiscal revenues and R&D expenditures sufficient to trigger a beneficial self-sustained growth. This result challenges the conventional view supported by Grossman and Yanagawa (1993) about a negative effect of bubbles in endogenous growth. However, under a higher tax rate on capital income, bubbles dampen the economic growth: thus, we recover the main conclusion by Grossman and Yanagawa (1993) .
Our paper contributes to the literature on the positive effects of bubbles. Among others, Farhi and Tirole (2012) , Martin and Ventura (2012) consider OLG models and point out that, under financial market imperfections, bubbles may be beneficial through the reallocation of funds from less to more productive investments in the private sector. study an infinitehorizon model and show that the effects of asset bubbles depend on financial market conditions: if the pledgeability level is relatively low (high), bubbles enhance (decrease) the economic growth rate. develop to take in account the connection between bailout policies and bubbles.
Framework
Consider a two-period OLG model of rational bubbles in the spirit of Tirole (1985) and Weil (1987) .
A representative firm maximizes the profit under a complete capital depreciation:
where K t and L t denote the aggregate capital and the labor forces, while R t and w t represent the return on capital and the wage rate. For simplicity, the production function is Cobb-Douglas:
where k t ≡ K t /L t denotes the capital intensity.
At period t, N t individuals are born. Each consumer-worker lives two periods. When young, she supplies one unit of labor, earns a labor income taxed at a constant rate τ , consumes c t and saves through capital s t and a long-lived asset a t . When old, she consumes d t+1 , that is the gross returns on capital and financial asset (which brings no dividend). These returns are taxed at the constant rates τ k and τ b . The price of consumption good is normalized to one while q t denotes the price of asset in consumption units at time t. Preferences are rationalized by a separable intertemporal utility function ln c t + β ln d t+1 , where β represents the discount rate. The agent faces two budget constraints (one per period):
to maximizes her utility with respect to s t , a t , c t and d t+1 .
Solving the program, we find the sharing between consumption and savings
jointly with the (equilibrium) no-arbitrage condition
and the budget constraints, now binding. The government levies taxes on labor income and gross returns on capital and the asset to finance public investment good:
where G t is the public investment good as a pure productive externality and n ≡ N t+1 /N t denotes the population growth rate, supposed to be constant. We focus on a simple model of public investment (R&D, for instance) in the spirit of Barro (1990) : A t = θG 1−α t for any t. Thus, G t affects the TFP, the product and the revenues from labor, capital and financial speculation. These revenues are supposed to affect in turn, within the same period, the tax receipt and the public spending G t at the end. This functional specification promotes endogenous growth dynamics. Definition 1.
1. An equilibrium is a positive sequence
satisfying (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), the market clearing conditions:
and budget constraints are binding for any t ≥ 0.
2. If q 0 > 0, the equilibrium is said to be bubbly, otherwise it is said to be bubbleless.
3
Equilibria in the asset and capital markets write na t+1 = a t and s t = nk t+1 . The asset volume shrinks exponentially: a t = a 0 n −t . Let b t ≡ q t a t denote the value of financial asset. Therefore, the equilibrium system writes:
where σ is the propensity to save in the bubbleless equilibrium (i.e., when b t = 0):
We see that a positive sequence (q t , R t , w t , c t , d t+1 , a t , s t , K t+1 , L t , G t ) t≥0 is driven by (1), (6), (7) and (8). In short, (k t+1 , b t ) t≥0 will denote an equilibrium sequence.
Equilibrium analysis
Our model bridges two theories: rational bubbles (à la Tirole (1985) ) and endogenous growth (à la Barro (1990) ). The main proposition rests on the balanced growth rates with and without bubbles. More precisely, we introduce the growth factors corresponding to the cases without bubble and with maximal bubble:
We notice that q 0 > 0 iff qt > 0 for any t.
captures how bubbly the equilibrium is, and
is the maximal bubble in the sense of Tirole (1985) . All is clarified by the following result which provides a complete characterization of all equilibria.
Proposition 1 (global dynamics).
1. If γ ≤ 1, there are no bubble (i.e., b t = 0 for any t). The equilibrium is unique and given by k t = ρ t 0 k 0 for any t ≥ 0.
2. If γ > 1, any equilibrium must satisfy b 0 ≤b 0 . And there is equilibrium indeterminacy: any sequence (k t+1 , b t ) t≥0 driven by (1), (6), (7) and (8) 
Fiscal policy and the existence of bubbles
According to Proposition 1, a bubble exists if and only if γ > 1. We see that both γ andb 0 are increasing in τ k but decreasing in τ and τ b . So, bubbles are more likely to appear when tax rates on asset bubble and labor income are low and/or the tax rate on capital income is high. The intuition is straightforward: when the capital income tax increases, consumers invest less in capital and more in the bubble (portfolio substitution effect). By contrast, when the bubble income tax τ b is high enough, agents no longer invest in the asset bubble and, then, bubbles are ruled out.
We also observe that capital taxation promotes instability (in the sense of equilibrium multiplicity), while taxation on financial assets and labor income promotes stability (in the sense of equilibrium uniqueness).
It is easy to see that γ > 1 is equivalent to
Therefore when τ b = τ k = 0, we recover part (b) of Proposition 1 in Tirole (1985) . Tirole (1985) works with general production and utility functions, and proves the existence of a thresholdb 0 without computing it. Our specific production and utility functions allow us to provide the explicit expression forb 0 in terms of the fundamental parameters and, hence, to compute the effects of these parameters on the bubble. To the best of our knowledge, this outcome is also new in the theoretical literature.
We finally observe that, under a tax distortion (τ b = τ k ), the overaccumulation inequality n > f ′ (k * ) is no longer sufficient to ensure the existence of a bubbly equilibrium. A similar result holds in Kunieka (2011) with a significant difference: we provide a global analysis (of transition dynamics) instead of a steady state analysis.
Fiscal policy, bubbles and growth
Focus on the second case of Proposition 1 (γ > 1) and study the relationship between ρ 0 and ρ 1 (the growth factors when bubbles are respectively asymptotically negligible and non-negligible).
Noticing that γ does not depend on θ, we find an immediate consequence.
Corollary 1. The growth rates ρ 0 and ρ 1 are increasing in the government's efficiency θ.
ρ 0 depend on the fiscal pair (τ, τ k ) and ρ 1 on the triplet (τ, τ b , τ k ). The functions ρ 0 (τ, τ k ) and ρ 1 (τ, τ b , τ k ) are continuous in (τ, τ b , τ k ). Moreover, ρ 0 (0, 0) < ρ 1 (0, 0, τ b ) with τ b > 0. This leads to a comparative proposition.
we have γ > 1 and ρ 1 > ρ 0 : the growth rate with asymptotically non-negligible bubble exceeds the rate with asymptotically negligible bubble.
Condition τ b <τ b ensures γ > 1 when τ k and τ are low enough, which implies in turn that a bubbly equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2 deserves some economic intuitions. Since the R&D process is financed by taxes, the growth rate depends on the fiscal policy. When the labor and capital income taxes are low, the key instrument becomes the tax rate τ b on the asset bubble. In this case, when this tax rate is sufficiently high (τ b > τ b ), the growth factor ρ 1 (with asymptotically non-negligible bubble) turns out to be higher than the growth factor ρ 0 (with asymptotically negligible bubble).
Our findings suggest that the existence of a bubble (such as a housing bubble) may be beneficial to economic growth. This point of view challenges the one in Grossman and Yanagawa (1993) where it is shown that an asset bubble absorbs the savings of a market economy experiencing underaccumulation (because of positive productive externalities), and, in the end, makes the situation worse.
Consider eventually the case where the government applies a higher tax rate on capital income. It is easy to check that ρ 0 > ρ 1 if and only if
Ceteris paribus, γ tends to infinity when τ k tends to one. In the limit, condition (11) is satisfied, or, equivalently, ρ 0 > ρ 1 .
